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Abstract. We show how to extend a coordination language with sup-
port for aspect oriented programming. The main challenge is how to
properly deal with the trapping of actions before the actual data have
been bound to the formal parameters. This necessitates dealing with
open joinpoints – which is more demanding than the closed joinpoints
in more traditional aspect oriented languages like AspectJ. The useful-
ness of our approach is demonstrated by mechanisms for discretionary
and mandatory access control policies, as usually expressed by reference
monitors, as well as mechanisms for logging actions.
1 Introduction
Motivation. Software development faces the challenge of guaranteeing the com-
pliance of software to security policies even when the software has been developed
without adequate considerations of security. This situation might arise due to
lack of skills of the application programmers, due to lack of trust in the applica-
tion programmers or even due to modifications of the security properties after
the original development of the sofware (e.g. to cater for new needs of the users).
Taking access control as an example, a number of schemes for discretionary ac-
cess control (e.g. based on capability lists or access control lists) and mandatory
access control (e.g. the Bell LaPadula policy for confidentiality) have been pro-
posed for controlling the execution of software [13]. As an example, the attempt
to read from a file where the program has insufficient access rights should not
be successful. As another example, transferring data from a file with high se-
curity classification to a file with low security classification should also not be
successful.
The traditional approach to enforcing such security policies is through a refer-
ence monitor [13] that dynamically tracks the execution of the program; it makes
appropriate checks on each basic operation being performed, either blocking the
operation or allowing it to proceed. In concrete systems this is implemented as
part of the operating system or as part of the interpreter for the language at hand
(e.g. the Java byte code interpreter); in both cases as part of the trusted com-
puting base. When modelled using operational semantics, a reference monitor
is usually a side condition to an inference rule either preventing or allowing the
rule to be applicable. Sometimes it is found to be more cost effective to system-
atically modify the code so as to explicitly perform the checks that the reference
monitor would otherwise have imposed; the term inlined reference monitors [9]
has been coined for this.
An interesting approach to separation of concerns when programming systems
is presented by the notion of aspect oriented programming [15, 16]. The enforce-
ment of security policies is an obvious candidate for such separation of con-
cerns, e.g. because the security policy can be implemented by more skilled or
more trusted programmers, or indeed because security considerations can be
retrofitted by (re)defining advice to suit the (new) security policy. This requires
that a notion of aspects is supported by the programming language. The de-
tailed definition of the advice will then make decisions about how to possibly
modify the operation being trapped. In concrete systems this calls for a modified
language (like AspectJ [3] for Java) that supports the use of aspects. When mod-
elled using operational semantics a notion of trapping operations and applying
advice needs to be incorporated. Usually, it is found to be more cost effective to
systematically modify the code so as to explicitly perform the operations that
the advice would otherwise have imposed; the term weaving (e.g. [3]) has been
coined for this.
In many cases the aspect oriented approach provides a more flexible way to deal
with modifications in security policies [8, 10, 11, 21, 24] than the use of reference
monitors [20]. It facilitates to use frameworks for security policies that may be
well suited to the task at hand but that are perhaps not of general applicability
and therefore not appropriate for incorporating into a reference monitor. We
should like to refer to this process as internalising the reference monitor into
a piece of advice. An example would be the enforcement of policies related to
information flow or policies targeting the explicit needs of individuals; in partic-
ular this applies to the modelling of discretionary and mandatory access control
policies [13] as well as mechanisms for logging actions. Since we do not offer
priorities on advice we shall assume that the provision of advices is a priviledged
operation.
Contribution. Our main contribution is the integration of aspects into a coordi-
nation language that facilitates distribution of data, mobility of code, and the
ability to work with dynamically evolving, open systems. Rather than invent a
completely new language, we define a small kernel language for mobile agents
based on KLAIM [5, 18, 19]. We present this language in Section 2; as in KLAIM,
processes and action prefixes (LINDA’s read, in, and out) are located.
In our extension action prefixes are the potential joinpoints – the places where
execution can be interrupted by a piece of advice. We take the approach that
input actions should be trapped before a concrete tuple has been selected for
input. This is because we find that the alternative approach, to trap after a
concrete tuple has been selected for input, would constitute a covert channel
[12, 13]; indeed, the presence or absence of a tuple in the tuple space might
either enable or prevent the advice to trap the action and this would amount to
visible behaviour bypassing the security policy.
Trapping an input action before a concrete tuple has been selected for input
requires our ability to deal with joinpoints that contain constructs for binding
new variables – we shall call these open joinpoints. This is considerably more
challenging than the closed joinpoints of traditional aspect oriented language like
AspectJ [15]. To be more concrete, when we trap a method call in AspectJ we
trap the actual call, i.e. the method name with its actual parameters, rather than
the definition of the method, i.e. the method name with its formal parameters;
in other words AspectJ traps closed joinpoints rather than open joinpoints. We
show how to solve this challenge in Section 3 and provide a series of examples
in Section 4.
The design space for how to introduce advice into coordination languages is quite
broad. We have aimed for a modest approach being inspired by the operations of
reference monitors; they generally allow to block an action or to let it proceed. A
number of extensions can be foreseen – some of these are rather straightforward
whereas others pose considerable difficulties; as a case in point it is nontrivial
to add advice for ignoring or redirecting a given action. We discuss parts of the
design space in Section 5.
2 KLAIM
The syntax of our fragment of KLAIM is defined in Table 1. We restrict ourselves
to a core language for presentational purposes; it is straightforward to add the
actions newloc and eval but we will not need these for the examples. Despite
the rather modest selection of operations in our language it is still useful for
quite a variety of applications related to business processes and similar workflow
applications.
A net N is a parallel composition of located processes or located tuples. For
simplicity, components of tuples can be location constants only. Nets must be
closed, meaning that all variables must be in scope of a defining occurrence.
A process P is a parallel composition of processes, a guarded sum of action
prefixed processes, or a replication (indicated by the ∗ operator). The guarded
sum
∑
i ai.Pi is written 0 if the index set is empty.
N ∈ Net N ::= N1 || N2 | l :: P | l :: 〈−→l 〉
P ∈ Proc P ::= P1 | P2 |Pi ai.Pi | ∗P
a ∈ Act a ::= out(−→`)@` | in(
−→
`λ)@` | read(
−→
`λ)@`
`, `λ ∈ Loc ` ::= u | l `λ ::= ` | !u
Table 1. KLAIM Nets and Processes Syntax
A tuple can be output to a location, input from a location, or read from a
location (meaning that it is not removed). Parameters can be location constants
l, defining occurrences of location variables !u, and applied occurrences of a
location variable u. We use ` for location expressions (i.e. location variables and
constants); and in patterns we use `λ which in addition to location expressions
also include defining occurrences of locations. The scope of a defining occurrence
is the entire process to the right of the occurrence.
Example 1. Assume that the location YP, for Yellow Pages, contains pairs of
values representing names and phone numbers and that the location DB, for the
database of a phone company, contains triples of values representing a particular
phone call, that is, the phone number of the caller, the cost of the call and the
name of the recipient. Consider the process:
User :: read(!name, !telno)@YP.
read(telno, !val1, !val2)@DB.
out(val1)@name
Here User will first read a pair from the location YP and assign its two compo-
nents to the variables name and telno. Next the location DB is consulted to read
a triple whose first component equals the value of telno and the corresponding
second component is assigned to the variable val1 and the corresponding third
component is assigned to the variable val2. The final construct will write the
first value to the location associated with name.
Well-formedness of Locations and Actions. To express the well-formedness con-
ditions we shall introduce functions bv and fv for calculating the bound, resp.
free, variables of the various kinds of locations that may occur in actions. The def-
initions are standard, in particular, bv(l, u, !v) = {v} whereas fv(l, u, !v) = {u}.
An input action is well-formed if its sequence
−→`
λ = `1, · · · , `k (for k ≥ 0) of
locations is well-formed and this is the case when the following two conditions
are fulfilled:
∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · , k} : i 6= j ⇒ bv(`λi ) ∩ bv(`λj ) = ∅ and
bv(
−→`
λ) ∩ fv(−→`λ) = ∅
l :: P1 | P2 ≡ l :: P1 || l :: P2 l :: ∗P ≡ l :: P | ∗P
N1 ≡ N2
N || N1 ≡ N || N2
Table 2. KLAIM Structural Congruence.
ls :: out(
−→
l )@l0.P + · · · → ls :: P || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉
ls :: in(
−→
`λ)@l0.P + · · · || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉 → ls :: Pθ if match(
−→
`λ;
−→
l ) = θ
ls :: read(
−→
`λ)@l0.P + · · · || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉 → ls :: Pθ || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉 if match(
−→
`λ;
−→
l ) = θ
N1 → N ′1
N1 || N2 → N ′1 || N2
N ≡ N ′ N ′ → N ′′ N ′′ ≡ N ′′′
N → N ′′′
Table 3. KLAIM Reaction Semantics (on closed nets).
The first condition demands that we do not use multiple defining occurrences
of the same variable in an action. The second condition requires that bound
variables and free variables cannot share any name in a single action. Thus we
shall disallow in(!u, u)@l as well as in(!u, !u)@l.
Semantics of KLAIM. The semantics is given by a one-step reduction relation
on nets and is defined in Table 3. We make use of the structural congruence
on nets; this is an associative and commutative (with respect to ||) equivalence
relation and the interesting cases are defined in Table 2.
The rule for out is rather straightforward; it uses the fact that the action selected
may be part of a guarded sum to dispense with any other alternatives. The rules
for in and read only progress if the formal parameters
−→`
λ match the candidate
tuple
−→
l . The details of the matching operation are given in Table 4 (explained
below); if the matching succeeds and produces a substution then the rule applies;
if no substitution is produced (due to a fail in part of the computation) the rule
does not apply.
The matching operation of Table 4 returns a substitution θ being a (potentially
empty) list of pairs of the form [l/u]; if the list is empty it is denoted by id.
Notice that the definition does not treat location variables because tuples in the
tuple space may only contain location constants and the reaction semantics is
restricted to closed nets.
match(〈〉; 〈〉) = id
match(〈`′λ1 , · · · , `′λk 〉; 〈l1, · · · , lk〉) = let θ = case `′λ1 of
l′1 : if l
′
1 = l1 then id else fail
!u : [l1/u]
in θ ◦match(〈`′λ2 , · · · , `′λk 〉; 〈l2, · · · , lk〉)
Table 4. KLAIM Pattern Matching of Templates against Tuples.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1 we may consider the following net and some
steps of its execution:
YP :: 〈Alice, 55010〉 || YP :: 〈Bob, 58266〉
|| DB :: 〈55010, 100,Bob〉 || DB :: 〈58266, 1000,Alice〉
|| User :: ∗ read(!name, !telno)@YP. read(telno, !val1, !val2)@DB. out(val1)@name
→
YP :: 〈Alice, 55010〉 || YP :: 〈Bob, 58266〉
|| DB :: 〈55010, 100,Bob〉 || DB :: 〈58266, 1000,Alice〉
|| User :: read(55010, !val1, !val2)@DB. out(val1)@Alice
| ∗ read(!name, !telno)@YP. read(telno, !val1, !val2)@DB. out(val1)@name
→
YP :: 〈Alice, 55010〉 || YP :: 〈Bob, 58266〉
|| DB :: 〈55010, 100,Bob〉 || DB :: 〈58266, 1000,Alice〉
|| User :: out(100)@Alice
| ∗ read(!name, !telno)@YP. read(telno, !val1, !val2)@DB. out(val1)@name
→
YP :: 〈Alice, 55010〉 || YP :: 〈Bob, 58266〉
|| DB :: 〈55010, 100,Bob〉 || DB :: 〈58266, 1000,Alice〉
|| Alice :: 〈100〉
|| User :: ∗ read(!name, !telno)@YP. read(telno, !val1, !val2)@DB. out(val1)@name
In the first step User spawns a thread and reads the pair 〈Alice, 55010〉 from YP;
the bindings of the variables name and telno are reflected in the continuation of
the thread. In the second step it is only possible to read a triple from DB that
has 55010 as its first component; this results in binding val1 and val2 to 100 and
Bob, respectively. The last step will then complete the thread by outputting the
value 100 to Alice.
Example 3. Returning to Example 1 we may want to impose the condition that
only some users are allowed to access the location DB containing secret data
whereas all users are allowed to read from the location YP containing only public
data. This can be expressed with discretionary access control using an access
control matrix DAC containing triples (s, o, a) identifying which subjects s can
perform which operations a on which objects o. We may thus equip the semantics
of KLAIM with a reference monitor that will consult DAC whenever an action is
executed; in particular, whenever User is performing a read action on a location
S ∈ System S ::= let −→asp in N
asp ∈ Asp asp ::= A[cut] , body
body ∈ Advice body ::= case (cond) sbody ; body | sbody
sbody ::= as break | as proceed as
as ∈ Act∗ as ::= a.as | ε
cond ∈ BExp cond ::= test(
−→
`λ)@` | `1 = `2 | cond1 ∧ cond2 | ¬ cond
cut ∈ Cut cut ::= ` :: a
`λ ∈ Loc `λ ::= ` | !u | ?u
Table 5. AspectK Syntax
l it will check whether (User, l, read) ∈ DAC and only proceed if this is the case.
Similarly when performing an out action on some location l it will check whether
(User, l,out) ∈ DAC before proceeding.
A comparable policy can be imposed by a reference monitor based on mandatory
access control. Here security levels are assigned to subjects and object. In the
simple case of just two security levels we may give DB the level high and YP the
level low. The Bell-LaPadula security policy will then impose that a low user can
only perform read actions on YP whereas out actions can be performed on any
location. A high user, on the other hand, will be able to perform read actions
on both YP and DB. The out action can only be performed on high locations
unless a notion of declassification is imposed that will lower the users’ security
level.
3 AspectK
Syntax. The syntax of AspectK extends the syntax of KLAIM (Table 1) as
shown in Table 5. A system S consists of a net N prefixed by a sequence of
aspect declarations. An aspect declaration takes the form A[cut] , body, where
A is the name of the aspect, cut is the action to be trapped by A and body
specifies the way it should be handled.
The keyword break indicates that the original action is suppressed and prevents
the process from being further executed, whereas the keyword proceed allows
the original action to execute. In case of multiple aspects that trap an action,
all the before actions are executed in declaration order, then the original action
(in case of no break), and finally the after actions in reverse declaration order.
The keyword break takes precedence over the keyword proceed.
N → N ′ (where globally ΓA = −→asp)
let −→asp in N → let −→asp in N ′
ls :: stop.P + · · · → ls :: 0
ls :: out(
−→
l )@l0.P + · · · → ls :: P || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉
ls :: in(
−→
`λ)@l0.P + · · · || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉 → ls :: Pθ if match(
−→
`λ;
−→
l ) = θ
ls :: read(
−→
`λ)@l0.P + · · · || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉 → ls :: Pθ || l0 :: 〈−→l 〉 if match(
−→
`λ;
−→
l ) = θ
ls :: Φproceed(ΓA; ls :: out(
−→
l )@l0).P → N
ls :: out(
−→
l )@l0.P + · · · → N
ls :: Φproceed(ΓA; ls :: in(
−→
`λ)@l0).P || N ′ → N
ls :: in(
−→
`λ)@l0.P + · · · || N ′ → N
ls :: Φproceed(ΓA; ls :: read(
−→
`λ)@l0).P || N ′ → N
ls :: read(
−→
`λ)@l0.P + · · · || N ′ → N
Table 6. Reaction Semantics (on closed nets)
The cond is similar to a standard boolean expression, which will be evaluated to
true or false. The primitive test(
−→`
λ)@` will only be evaluated to true in case
that there is a tuple that matches
−→`
λ in the tuple space at location `.
A cutpoint cut is simply a cut action accompanied by location `. For the use in
cut actions we have extended the definition of `λ to incorporate a new location
expression ?u that is intended to trap both !u and l occurring in actions; this
will be made precise in the definition of the check function in Table 9.
Well-formedness of Cuts. We define cl(cut) that generates a list of entities in-
volved in a cut. For example:
cl(ls :: in(!x, y, ?z)@l0) = 〈ls, x, y, z, l0〉
In addition to the well-formedness conditions for KLAIM, we require that the
variables of cl(cut) are pairwise distinct. When !u or ?u is used in a cut pattern,
u should only occur in the after actions (actions that occur after proceed); in
particular u should neither be used in any before action nor in any conditionals.
No use of ?u will be allowed inside tests (use !u instead).
Semantics of AspectK. The semantics is given by a one-step reduction relation
on well-formed systems and nets. The interesting rules are defined in Table 6 –
the rule for reduction on nets and a congruence rule (see Table 3) are omitted –
and we also make use of the structural congruence on nets defined in Table 2.
The rules for the three actions come in pairs, as is illustrated in Table 6. One
rule takes care of the action when no advice is allowed to interrupt it; this is
syntactically denoted by underlining.
Φf (A[cut] , body, ΓA; ` :: a) = case trap(cut, ` :: a) of fail : Φf (ΓA; ` :: a)
θ : κΓA,`::af (body θ)
Φf (ε; ` :: a) = case f of proceed : a
break : stop
Table 7. Trapping Aspects: Step 1.
trap(cut, ` :: a) = case (cut, ` :: a) of
(`s :: out(
−→`
)@`0, ls :: out(
−→
l )@l0) : check(〈`s,−→`, `0〉, 〈ls,−→l , l0〉)
(`s :: in(
−→
`λ)@`0, ls :: in(
−→
`′λ)@l0) : check(〈`s,
−→
`λ, `0〉, 〈ls,
−→
`′λ, l0〉)
(`s :: read(
−→
`λ)@`0, ls :: read(
−→
`′λ)@l0) : check(〈`s,
−→
`λ, `0〉, 〈ls,
−→
`′λ, l0〉)
otherwise fail
Table 8. Trapping Aspects: Step 2.
check(〈〉, 〈〉) = id
check(〈`λ1 , `λ2 , · · · , `λk〉, 〈`′λ1 , · · · , `′λk 〉) = let θ = case (`λ1 , `′λ1 ) of
(!u, !u′) : [u′/u]
(?u, !u′) : [u′/u]
(?u, l′) : [l′/u]
(u, l′) : [l′/u]
(l, l′) : if l = l′ then id else fail
otherwise fail
in θ ◦ check(〈`λ2 , · · · , `λk〉, 〈`′λ2 , · · · , `′λk 〉)
Table 9. Trapping Aspects: Step 3.
The rules for the non-underlined actions all take the same shape and make use
of the function Φ defined in Table 7. The result of Φf (ΓA; ` :: a) is a sequence
of actions trapping ` :: a; ΓA is a global environment of aspects. The index f is
either proceed or break. In general f will be break if at least one “break”
advice applies, otherwise it will be proceed. In case of proceed the action a is
eventually emitted, otherwise it will be dispensed with and be replaced with the
stop action, killing all the subsequent actions. Recall that advice is searched in
the order of declaration and applies in a parenthesis-like fashion.
The function Φ uses an auxiliary function trap (see Table 8) to step through
the aspects in the aspects environment. In each case, trap checks whether the
κΓA,`::af (case cond sbody ; body) = case B(cond) of tt : κ
ΓA,`::a
f (sbody)
ff : κΓA,`::af (body)
κΓA,`::af (sbody) = case sbody of as1 proceed as2 : as1.Φf (ΓA; ` :: a).as2
as break : as.Φbreak(ΓA; ` :: a)
Table 10. Trapping Aspects: Step 4.
B(test(
−→
`λ)@l) =
8><>:
tt if there exists a tuple
−→
l at location l
such that match(
−→
`λ;
−→
l ) 6= fail
ff otherwise
B(l1 = l2) =

tt if l1 = l2
ff otherwise
B(cond1 ∧ cond2) =

tt if B(cond1) = tt and B(cond2) = tt
ff if B(cond1) = ff or B(cond2) = ff
B(¬cond) =

tt if B(cond) = ff
ff if B(cond) = tt
Table 11. Trapping Aspects: Step 5.
cut matches the action; the check is accomplished by using a further auxiliary
function, check (see Table 9), which either fails or produces a substitution for the
variables occurring in the cut. The check function is essentially an extension of
the match function (see Table 4) to accommodate the matching of cut patterns.
If a cut matches a normal action, we use κΓA,`::af (see Table 10) to recursively
search for further advices; body θ is computed in the obvious way.
The κΓA,`::af function processes the advice associated with a matching cut. The
first clause in the definition processes conditional advices using the function
B, displayed in Table 11, to evaluate the condition. The second clause deals
with non-conditional advices which are either proceed or break advices. In the
former case, the before actions and after actions sandwich a recursive call to
Φ to find further applicable aspects. In the latter case, the before actions are
performed and Φ is called recursively to find further applicable aspects taking
care to record the fact that a break has been encountered. Eventually, when
all aspects in the aspect environment have been considered, the second clause
of Φ is invoked (see Table 7). If no break has been encountered, the underlined
action is emitted, otherwise a stop is emitted. In the latter case, the program
will terminate after all of the before actions have been executed.
4 Example Programs
We now show a series of examples to illustrate how AspectK can be used to
encode various security policies.
Example 4. The discretionary access control of Example 3 can be imposed by
introducing a location DAC containing two kinds of triples
– 〈user,DB, read〉 for selected users, and
– 〈user, name,out〉 for the same selected users and all names.
The following aspect declarations will then impose the desired requirements:
AreadDAC [u :: read(?x, ?y, ?z)@DB] , case(test(u,DB, read)@DAC)
proceed;
break
AoutDAC[u :: out(z)@l] , case(test(u, l,out)@DAC)
proceed;
break
The first action read(!name, !key)@YP of User in Examples 1 and 2 will not be
trapped by any of the aspects so it will simply be performed resulting in binding
Alice to name and 55010 to telno as in Example 2.
The aspect AreadDAC will trap the second action in Examples 1 and 2 which now is
read(55010, !val1, !val2)@DB
The resulting substitution is [User/u, 55010/x, val1/y, val2/z] and we are eval-
uating the condition test(User,DB, read)@DAC. If this test evaluates to false
then the advice break is taken and terminates the execution. Alternatively, we
proceed and perform the action read(55010, !val1, !val2)@DB thereby giving rise
to the binding of 100 to val1 and Bob to val2.
Finally, the aspect AoutDAC will trap the last action which is now out(100)@Alice;
also here the test will succeed and the proceed advice will be selected so that
the original out is executed.
Using aspects it is easy to modify the access control policy so as to allow a
user to access his own entries in DB even though he does not have access to the
complete database. We simply modify the aspect AreadDAC to become
AreadDAC−1[u :: read(!x, ?y, ?z)@DB]
, break
AreadDAC−2[u :: read(x, ?y, ?z)@DB]
, case(test(u,DB, read)@DAC ∨ test(u, x)@YP)
proceed;
break
Example 5. To model the mandatory access control policy of Example 3 we
introduce a location MAC with the following pairs:
– 〈YP, low〉 reflecting that the phonebook has low security level,
– 〈DB, high〉 reflecting that the customer database has high security level,
– 〈s, low〉 for all users and names s with low security level, and
– 〈s, high〉 for all users and names s with high security level.
We now consider the Bell-LaPadula security policy in a setting where both sub-
jects and objects have fixed security levels. The first part of the policy states
that a subject is allowed to read or input data from any object provided that
the object’s security level dominates that of the object; this is captured by the
following aspects (which enforce no read-up):
Aread2MAC [u :: read(?x, ?y)@l] , case(¬(test(u, low)@MAC ∧ test(l, high)@MAC))
proceed;
break
Aread3MAC [u :: read(?x, ?y, ?z)@l] , case(¬(test(u, low)@MAC ∧ test(l, high)@MAC))
proceed;
break
The second part of the policy, the star property, allows a subject to write to
any object provided that the security level of the object dominates that of the
subject. This is captured by the following aspect (enforcing no write-down):
AoutMAC[u :: out(z)@l] , case(¬(test(u, high)@MAC ∧ test(l, low)@MAC))
proceed;
break
With these aspects in place a user with low security level will only be able to
perform the action read(!name, !key)@YP; once he attempts doing the action
read(key, !val1, !val2)@DB the advice break will stop the execution. A user
with high security level will be able to perform both of these actions but may be
stopped at the third action out(val)@name if the security level of the location
bound to name turns out to be low.
In order to allow a high user to write to a low name we may introduce declassi-
fication of security levels. To keep things simple we may do so by introducing a
billing location that does not need to adhere to the security policy and replace
the process by:
User :: read(!name, !key)@YP.
read(key, !val1, !val2)@DB.
out(name, val1, val2)@Billing
|| Billing :: in(!n, !v1, !v2)@Billing. out(v1)@n
We add the pair 〈Billing, high〉 to the MAC location thereby allowing all high
users to output to Billing; we also modify the aspect for out actions to ensure
that they are always allowed to proceed at the Billing location:
AoutMAC[u :: out(z)@l] , case(¬(test(u, high)@MAC ∧ test(l, low)@MAC)
∨(u = Billing))
proceed;
break
Example 6. As a final example, which illustrates the need for actions both before
and after proceed we define an aspect which maintains a log of read action on
DB:
ALOG[u :: read(?x, ?y, ?z)@DB] , in(sem)@semaphore
proceed
out(u, x, y, z)@logfile.
out(sem)@semaphore
We use a semaphore to ensure that the reads and the updating of the log file are
kept in lock step, meaning that at any time at most one read action has been
performed but still needs to be logged. The before action grabs the semaphore,
proceed allows the read to be performed and the parameters that are bound in
the read are recorded in the log file before the semaphore is released. In a similar
way we can log out actions.
5 Conclusion
Summary. We have shown how to extend a coordination language with support
for aspect oriented programming. While we have only performed the technical
development for a fragment of KLAIM we do believe that our approach and our
findings would apply to a larger class of coordination languages.
A distinguishing feature of coordination languages with respect to object ori-
ented languages and web service languages [7] is the need to deal with open
joinpoints, i.e. joinpoints that contain mechanisms for binding variables. Similar
considerations would apply if we were to incorporate aspects into process alge-
bras that, like the pi-calculus, allow a notion of open input (or input from the
environment) but would not be necessary for calculi without this feature [1, 6,
14, 22, 23]. This calls for considerable care in designing a notion of advice where
input actions are trapped before a concrete tuple has been selected for input.
We argued in the Introduction that the more standard choice of trapping an
action after a concrete tuple has been selected would constitute a covert channel
in the presence of open joinpoints. Our technical solution to this challenge was
presented in Section 3 and we believe it to be applicable to open joinpoints in
general.
In our development we focused on just two types of basic advice, break and
proceed, together with actions performed before or after the advice (in order
to obtain some of the benefits of around advice). We showed by means of ex-
amples that our approach is sufficiently flexible for defining aspects for enforcing
discretionary and mandatory access control policies as well as mechanisms for
logging actions. As argued in the Introduction we find this to be both a more
flexible and less error-prone way of accomodating new security policies. Also we
only considered the possibility of fixed global advice applicable at all locations.
There are different views as to whether the actions generated by an advice should
also be subject to further advice. Throughout the development we have taken the
view that this is indeed desirable. But it is straightforward to modify Table 10
to use underlined before and after actions so as to accommodate the alternative
view.
Similarly, the use of a global test is often considered hard to implement because
of the need to synchronise the whole network [18]. In our examples we have taken
the view that we only perform tests on special persistant databases.
We now discuss the possibility of extending our design.
Types of advice. We did consider the incorporation of an ignore advice, as is
commonly expressible in aspect oriented object oriented languages, but some-
what surprisingly found this to be a challenging extension.
To illustrate the problems consider the following advice
AIGNORE[u :: read(!v)@lpriv] , ignore
for simply ignoring inputs from a private location lpriv. The problem with
this definition is that it might be trapping a read action occurring in the
following process l :: read(!w)@lpriv.out(w)@lprint which would then become
l : out(w)@lprint that contains a free variable; however, our semantics does not
ascribe meaning to such processes!
Even a somewhat more useful advice
AREDIRECT[u :: read(!v)@lpriv] , ignore u :: read(!v)@lsandbox
for redirecting inputs from a private location lpriv to a sandbox lsandbox is prob-
lematic. Once again consider the program l :: read(!w)@lpriv.out(w)@lprint that
is intended to become l :: read(!w)@lsandbox.out(w)@lprint. The problem is that
our current notion of substitution does not achieve this effect: while we can bind
v to w to obtain the substitution [w/v], we would not normally let the substi-
tution change the defining occurrence !v in u :: read(!v)@lsandbox to !w so as to
yield the desired u :: read(!w)@lsandbox.
This can be solved by suitable extensions of our approach; in particular we
can introduce special variables, e.g. β, that can be substituted also in defining
occurrences and write
AREDIRECT[u :: read(!β)@lpriv] , ignore u :: read(!β)@lsandbox
Then the program l :: read(!w)@lpriv.out(w)@lprint would correctly be trans-
formed to l :: read(!w)@lsandbox.out(w)@lprint.
Local or global advice. For simplicity we have taken an approach where all advice
is given in advance and is global in scope. It would be worthwhile to be able to
introduce new pieces of advice and to limit the scope of its applicability. Indeed,
it might be natural to consider the aspect environment to be distributed and
associated with locations. In that case it would be appropriate to extend the
syntax with a newloc(u : Γ ) construct with inference rule:
l ::Γ newloc(u : Γ ′).P → l ::Γ P [l′/u] || l′ ::Γ ′ 0 with l′ fresh
This would constitute a static treatment of scoped advice unlike the dynamic
treatment in CaesarJ [2].
This would be useful when dealing with the eval action. Here we would extend
the syntax of processes with a process identifier X that could match an arbitrary
process. Then we might write an advice for executing a process in a sandbox as
follows:
ASANDBOX[u ::γ eval(X)@lsensitive] ,
newloc(usandbox : γ[ABOXREAD[u ::γ
′
out(v)@w] , u ::γ′ out(v)@usandbox])
ignore
u ::γ eval(X)@usandbox
When executing a program l ::Γ eval(P )@lsensitive.P ′ the advice transforms it
to a process that evaluates the process in a confined location and redirects all
outputs to a confined location.
Clearly a number of additional extensions can be contemplated. For example we
might want to have more powerful pointcut languages [4, 17] allowing patterns
that bind over a number of parameters (in order to avoid having separate advice
for each arity of the operations) or giving priorities to advice. However, our goal
was to demonstrate both the need to, and the possibility of, dealing with open
joinpoints.
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